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So off marched the emperor in the procession under the
beautiful canopy, and everybody in the street and at the win-
dows cried: "Aren't the emperor's new clothes wonderful!
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What a lovely train he has to his robe! What a splendid fit!"
Nobody would let on that he couldn't see anything, because
then he would have been unfit for his job or very stupid.
Never had the emperor's clothes been such a success.
"But he hasn't got anything on!" cried a little child.
'"ear me! Listen to what the pretty innocent says!" cried
its father. And it was whispered from man to man what the
child had said.
"'He hasn't got anything on," says a little child. "He hasn't
got anything on!"'
"Why, but he hasn't got anything on!" they all shouted at
last. And the emperor winced, for he felt they were right. But
he thought to himself: "I must go through with the procession
now." And he drew himself up more proudly than ever, while
the chamberlains walked behind him, bearing the train that
wasn't there.
The Emperor's New Clothes, Hans Christian Andersen,
translated by Reginald Spink (1960).
I. INTRODUCTION: THE HYPE SURROUNDING DIGITAL
SIGNATURES
It has been an article of faith for several years now among many
observers that digital signatures' will be the "next big thing' for
1. This article follows what is now a widely followed convention in electronic
commerce circles by referring to a specific application of a specific technology as a "digital
signature" and using the term "electronic signature" to refer to electronic authentication
technologies that serve the same purpose as manual signatures. In this context, a digital
signature refers to:
[a] transformation of a message using an asymmetric cryptosystem and a
hash function such that a person having the initial message and the signer's
public key can accurately determine (1) whether the transformation was cre-
ated using the private key that corresponds to the signer's public key, and (2)
whether the initial message has been altered since the transformation was
made.
Information Security Committee, AB.A. Sec. Sci. & Tech., DIGITAL SIGNATURE
GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRuCTURE FoR CERTIFICATION AuTHoRrrIES AND SECURE
ELiiONIc COMMERCE § 1.11 (1996) [hereinafter DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES]. By
contrast, an electronic signature may refer to a name in the "From" header in an elec-
tronic mail message, a digitized handwritten signature such as are used by some retail
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Internet commerce.2 Digital signatures, authenticated with reference
to certificates administered within a "public key infrastructure" may
hold tremendous promise as a solution to the problem of establishing
the identity of parties doing business in cyberspace. That unrealized
potential is consistently mistaken for actual use in the marketplace,
however, leading to countless wildly inaccurate journalistic accounts
of digital signatures as the "most popular" or "most important" system
for Internet contract formation.'
Yet in early 2001, the number of Internet contracts that were
being formed in reliance on digital signature certificates still appears
to be trivially small in number, if not actually zero.4 Furthermore,
electronic point of sale payment systems, or a typed electronic version of a paper-based
holographic signature such as "/IJane Winn." Id.
The commercial value of a digital signature is usually presumed to be a function of
the certificate issued attesting to the identity of the owner of the digital signature. In the
Digital Signature Guidelines, a function served by a certificate is explained in the follow-
ing terms:
To associate a key pair with a prospective signer, a certification authority is-
sues a certificate, an electronic record which lists a public key as the subject
of the certificate, and confirms that the prospective signer identified in the
certificate holds the corresponding private key. The prospective signer is
termed the subscriber. A certificate's principal function is to bind a key pair
with a particular subscriber.
DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES at 13.
2. See Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier, Ten Risks of PKI: What You're not Be-
ing Told About Public Key Infrastructure, 16 COMPUTER SECURITY J. 1, 1-7 (2000), avail-
able at http'J/www.counterpane.com/pki-risks.html; Don Davis, Compliance Defects in
Public-Key Cryptography, Proc. 6th Usenix Security Symp, 171-178 (San Jose, CA, 1996),
available at http://world.std.com/-dtd/compliance/complianco.ps. But see Ben Laurie,
Seven and a Half Non-risks of PKI, available at http://www.apache-sal.orgf7.5things.txt
3. See, e.g., Sheryl Canter, Electronic Signatures - Now it's legal to sign docu-
ments electronically, but should you?, PC MAG., Jan. 2, 2001, at 102, available at Lexis
News ("The most common technology used for electronic signatures is the digital signa-
ture.'; Leslie Brooks Suzukamo, E-Signatures Gain Force of Law, But Users Face a
Learning Curve, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 1, 2000, available at Lexis News ("In its
most common form, a digital signature is, quite simply, extremely long strings of num-
bers and letters put together by a mathematical formula.'; James K. Watson, Jr. and
Carol Choky, Digital Signatures Seal Web Deals, INFORMATIONWEEK, Sept. 18, 2000,
available at Lexis News ("Digital signatures can be any form of electronic seal agreed to
by the two parties. The most common approach relies on digital certificates and encryp-
tion.'); Thomas E. Crocker, Resolve State Conflicts with Federal Electronic Authentication
Law, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at S43 available at Leids News ("The most widely ac-
oepted form of electronic authentication currently is based on cryptographic measures,
such as digital signatures, which involve mathematical formulas.")
4. The figure of zero Internet contracts formed in reliance on digital signatures
may be accurate if pilot projects are excluded. See, e.g., Tony Heffernan, Digital Signa-
tures Still 3 to 5 Years Away, THE Am. BANKER, Jan. 8, 2001 at 2A, available at Lexis
News; Jamie Lewis, PKI Won't Hit the Mainstream Until Vendors Reduce Complexity,
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
there is no indication that the situation will suddenly change in the
near future. After many years of enduring mind-numbingly dull ex-
planations of asymmetric cryptography, hash functions, public key in-
frastructures and stories of Bob and Alice who want to communicate
with the assistance of Carol certificate authority,5 perhaps the time
has come to admit that the market reality has not matched the hype.
This might also be a good time to analyze how the enthusiasm for this
technology could have reached such feverish heights in the absence of
any significant use in the marketplace, and how that enthusiasm can
persist today in the face of fairly compelling evidence that the hype
will never be realized.
This Article critiques a specific set of assumptions about specific
application of digital signature technology: that contracts will be
formed over the Internet among parties with no prior relationships
through reliance on digital signature certificates issued by trusted
third parties to establish the identity of the parties. This application
for digital signature technology was once seen as both its most ambi-
tious and most promising application because, for parties with no
prior knowledge of each other, there is not yet a reliable system of on-
line identities in Internet commerce. Parties with an ongoing com-
mercial relationship can absorb the cost of offline communications
such as faxes, telephone calls or face-to-face meetings to negotiate and
execute an agreement governing the setting up of a reliable system
for online authentication of parties to wholly electronic transactions. 6
Parties that want to rely exclusively on online communications to cre-
ate the framework for contracting as well as to enter into contracts,
however, face a problem of infinite regress: how can the online com-
munications that set up the system for confirming online identities it-
INTERNETWEEK, Jan. 8, 2001 at 25, available at Lexis News; Kelly Jackson Higgins, Pub-
lic Key Infrastructures - Few and Far Between, INTERNETWEEK ONLINE (Nov. 2, 2000), at
http://www.internetweek.com/lead/leadll020.htm; Tara C. Hogan, Now That the Flood-
gates Have Been Opened, Why Haven't Banks Rushed Into the Certifiation Authority
Business?, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 417 (2000); Digital Certifwates: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, March 8, 2001 (pointing out "As an example, consider the experience of VeriSign
Inc., a leading manufacturer of the 128-bit devices. Since 1998 it's installed more than
25,000 server certificates to financial institutions, but only about 345 client certificates.'),
available at http://www.thebankingchannel.contechnology/story.jsp?storyTBCQFNQUI
JC. In a February 14, 2001 email to the author, Ian Grigg contested the zero figure, and
pointed to http://webfunds.org/ricardo/contracts/digigold/ as an example. This Internet
contracting system is based on OpenPGP's web of trust, not a hierarchical PKI.
5. See generally Jane K. Winn, Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable Instru-
ments and Digital Signatures, 49 S.C. L. REV. 739, 763 n.150 (1998).
6. See generally ABA Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commer-
cial Use of Electronic Data Interchange: A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement,
45 Bus. LAW. 1645 (1990).
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self be authenticated with nothing more to rely on than online com-
munications? Many supporters of digital signatures believed legisla-
tion was essential to cut through this Gordian Knot. Legislation could
authorize parties unable to use a prior relationship or offline commu-
nications to confirm the validity of online identities to rely on digital
signature certificates instead. Much legislation regulating the use of
digital signatures is based on an unstated premise: liabilities must be
imposed by law because private agreements will not be adequate to
the task of regulating this technology.
What is now becoming apparent is that a more important com-
mercial for digital signatures than "open" Internet commerce among
strangers may be "closed" Internet commerce systems among parties
already in contractual privity with each other or to a system adminis-
trator. Internet commerce systems are being developed that require
parties to subscribe to a common, binding set of system rules, or lower
transaction costs among parties with pre-existing relationships. If this
is the "killer application" for digital signature technology, then laws
drafted to facilitate transactions among parties without a common set
of system rules or prior relationship may actually interfere with the
ability of interested parties to build and operate effective online con-
tracting systems.7 Because the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA) is silent with regard to what technologies parties may use in
electronic transactions and how they use those technologies, it is un-
likely to impose any unnecessary transaction costs on parties to elec-
tronic contracts.
In addition to "closed" Internet commerce systems, another major
application for digital signature technology may exist within network
security infrastructures that are transparent to transacting parties as
they operate. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) communication security is
an example of such an application.8 Such an application diverges from
the specific set of assumptions about the "signature" function of digi-
tal signatures this Article critiques because there is no conscious invo-
cation of the technology to "sign" anything by the end user. Similarly,
this Article does not address the use of digital signature certificates as
a substitute for sign-on systems that today rely on user IDs and pass-
7. For example, it is unclear the scope of the parties' ability to opt out of the li-
ability allocation provisions in the UNICTRAL Draft Model Law on Electronic Signa-
tures. See, A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.88 - Draft Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic Signatures available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/workinggroups
/wg-ec/wp-88e.pdf; Stewart Baker, et al., UNCITRAL Working Group Approves Model
Law on Electronic Signatures (November 2000 draft memo).
8. See infra Part III for a discussion of Secure Sockets Layer technology.
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words, or government programs for distributing digital signature cer-
tificates to control access to government records or to permit elec-
tronic submissions to government agencies.9
In the Hans Christian Andersen fairy tale, charlatans deceive
the emperor and his advisors into paying for clothing that simply does
not exist by claiming that anyone who cannot see the clothing is unfit
for his job. When the emperor finally walks down the street displaying
what he believes are his new clothes, a child points out his nakedness.
The credibility of the innocent child finally cuts through the duplicity
and fear of the adults who were afraid to say what they saw and end
the charade.
The story of how digital signatures came to be over-hyped and
underutilized iri electronic commerce is a bit more complex than this
fairy tale. In general, digital signatures and public key infrastructures
are important examples of cryptography technologies that today play
a major role in electronic commerce and information system security.
It seems likely, moreover, that the role of cryptography technologies
in general and digital signatures and public key infrastructures in
particular will continue to grow in the future. So the idea that digital
signatures are or will be an important element of Internet commerce
is not per se a fraud or an illusion. The specific application of asym-
metric cryptography to create the functional analog of an old fash-
ioned manual signature on a contract may well prove to be an illusion,
however." There is mounting evidence that trying to use asymmetric
9. One counterexample to the claim that no Internet contracts are being
formed in reliance on digital signature certificates can be found in the electric utility in-
dustry, where digital signature certificates are used to identify parties entitled to reserve
transmission capacity. This is a result of the Open Access Same Time Information Sys-
tem (OASIS) established by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 1996. See gen-
erally, Alexander Cavalli and Jane K Winn, Internet Security in the Electric Utility In-
dustry, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 459 (1998); California Independent System Operator Bidder's
Policy and Procedures Guide, available at http://www.caiso.om/docs/O9OO3a6O8O/O9/e3/
09003a608009e33c.pdf (explaining that digital signature certificates are required to par-
ticipate in an auction of "firm transmission rights" (FTR)). Reservation of transmission
capacity within a regulated industry following procedures mandated by federal regulators
creates a contract, but this application of digital signature technology does not involve the
formation of contracts in reliance on digital signatures and certificates in open Internet
commerce because it is product of a regulatory mandate applicable to a closed system.
10. See generally, Ellison and Schneier, supra note 2; Roger Clarke, Conven-
tional Public Key Infrastructure: An Artefact Ill-Fitted to the Needs of the Information So-
ciety, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/ PKIMisFit.html; Matt Blaze et.
al., The Role of Trust Management in Distributed Systems Security, in SECURE INTERNET
PROGRAMMING: SECURITY ISSUES FOR MOBiLE AND DISTRIBUTED OBJECTS (Vitek and Jen-
sen, eds., 1999), available at http://www.crypto.com/papers/trustmgt.pdf; Dan Geer, Risk
Management is Where the Money is, available at http:llwww.atstake.com/security/
risk management.pdf.
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cryptography as a signature on a contract is like trying to fit a square
peg into a round hole, and the effort to get that square peg into that
round hole has created a phenomenal sink hole into which countless
individuals and organizations have poured vast resources with few
tangible payoffs in sight.
Those promoting digital signatures and public key infrastruc-
tures have not generally been charlatans of the type Andersen de-
scribes, although most may have had pecuniary motives for promoting
a particular technology as the "next big thing" in Internet commerce.
Since countless individuals and organizations with pecuniary motives
routinely promote particular technologies as the "next big thing" in
electronic commerce, that is not evidence of bad faith. Rather, promo-
tion of proprietary technologies as supposedly essential elements of
the architecture of electronic commerce is business as usual in infor-
mation economy markets where vaporware and hype are standard op-
erating procedures and parties are routinely locked in mortal combat
trying to secure "first mover" advantages. If relatively few technolo-
gies have a chance to become incorporated into the network architec-
ture of electronic commerce, but those few that succeed have a shot at
vast profits secured by strong network effects, then astute buyers
should merely discount such claims accordingly. One of the most in-
teresting puzzles surrounding digital signatures is how so many indi-
viduals and organizations that should have known better could have
been duped into falling for the hype for so long in the face of mounting
evidence of its inaccuracy.
The fear of the bureaucrats in Andersen's fairy tale may have a
counterpart in the story of digital signatures hype. In the face of an
apparent global consensus that digital signatures would indeed be the
"next big thing," those who expressed skepticism about the inevitabil-
ity of the adoption of this technology risked looking like Luddites" or
ignoramuses. The global consensus about the inevitability of digital
signatures may have at least a partial basis in fact: it is quite likely
that this technology will be widely deployed to enhance network secu-
rity. That outcome remains possible even if it is never used as the
analog of a manual signature in traditional contracting practices. The
durability of the hype surrounding digital signatures seems also to be
due in part to the willingness of individuals to accept at face value in
11. Luddites were weavers whose trade was being destroyed by mechanized tex-
tile mills in England in the late 18th century. Encyclopedia Brittanica Online, Luddites,
at http://www.britannica.combcom/eb/article/0/0,5716,50450+1+49263,00.html?query=lud
dite (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
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formation they have obtained from questionable sources and repeat it
without bothering to confirm the accuracy of factual allegations.
The truth of the factual allegation that digital signatures are the
"most popular" form of online authentication in electronic commerce is
surprisingly difficult to establish. By all accounts from disinterested
parties, it may be one of the least popular forms of online authentica-
tion if the standard is the number of contracts formed or the dollar
value of transactions entered into in reliance on a digital signature
certificate. 12 The simple fact that no one is using digital signatures as
signatures to form contracts in open Internet commerce is constantly
obscured by references to the fact that pilot projects are underway or
have succeeded, or that standards groups are making rapid-progress
toward completing their work, or that experts all agree that digital
signatures are indeed the "next big thing" that no self-respecting elec-
tronic commerce cognoscente can live without.
As a result of apparently endless recycling of the contents of
public relations press releases 13 or mistaking a description in a statute
of a type of business practice for information about the actual popu-
larity of that business practice in the marketplace, the notion that
digital signatures are the most widely used form of authentication in
electronic commerce today has taken on something of the status of an
urban legend. No number of thoughtful refutations of the proposition
seem able to kill it off.14 After it has been defeated in one arena, such
as the U.S. Congress, then like the hydra it reappears in its original
form and multiplies in new arenas, such as the UNCITRAL working
group on electronic commerce15 or the E.U. Electronic Signatures Di-
rective. 16
A major part of the problem lies in equating what asymmetric
cryptography and a public key infrastructure do in the online context
with what a manual signature does in traditional contracting con-
texts. 7 Traditional signatures play a surprisingly nuanced and com-
12. See, e.g., Heffernan, supra note 4; Higgins, supra note 4; Hogan, supra note
4.
13. A search of the "wires" database in Lexis Nexis on February 5, 2001 for sto-
ries that included a reference to digital signature, pilot and success or succeed turned up
more than 60 press releases issued between 1995 and 2001.
14. See the sources cited in Clarke, supra note 10.
15. For information about UNCITRAL efforts to develop model legislation gov-
erning the use of digital signatures, see the UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic
Commerce Web site at http://www.uncitral.orglenglishlworkinggroups/wgecindex.htm.
16. Directive 1999/93/EC of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for
electronic signatures, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/media
/sign/Dir99-93-ecEN.pdf.
17. For a civil law perspective on these issues, see Babette Aalberts and Simone
van der Hof, Digital Signature Blindness: Analysis of Legislative Approaches to Electronic
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plex role in traditional contracting practices that prove very difficult
to map onto online security technology functions. Not all contracts re-
quire a signature to be enforceable, and not all signatures evidence a
signer's intent to enter into a binding legal relationship. To apply the
term "signature" to the processes performed using asymmetric cryp-
tography, X.509 certificates and a public key infrastructure is at best
a metaphor and at worse simply misleading. The poor fit between the
metaphorical label "signature" and the security functions performed
by digital signatures and public key infrastructure is not immediately
apparent to casual observers. Many sophisticated observers who no-
ticed the poor fit had a pecuniary motive not to make the mismatch
explicit. Add to these information asymmetries and conflicts of inter-
est the froth and manic energy of an Internet driven speculative bub-
ble, and few were interested in hearing the rather long, complicated
story of why digital signatures were not the "next big thing."
This Article is part of a symposium on the UETA. Given that the
UETA takes no position on the merits of digital signature technology
at all, an extended discussion of the lack of success to date in the use
of digital signatures in electronic contracts might appear to be a di-
gression from the central focus of the symposium. On the contrary,
the 'technology neutral" perspective taken by the UETA represents a
rejection of the approach taken by many countries which implicitly or
explicitly promote the use of digital signatures as an analog to a tradi-
tional manual signature and as a necessary element in the process of
forming electronic contracts. The UETA approach is a more appropri-
ate legislative response to the question of how digital signatures will
be used in electronic contracts because it permits business practices to
evolve and Internet authentication security technology to develop
through the work of standard-setting processes without mandates
from legislatures that appear to be unaware of actual market devel-
opments. Managing the rights and obligations of the parties through
standards and private agreements permits those with knowledge of
market conditions to continue to adapt and evolve information secu-
rity models more rapidly and more rationally than is possible through
the cumbersome and inexact process of legislation.
This Article will summarize the original consensus regarding the
role of digital signatures in electronic commerce, explain why that
consensus was mistaken on many points, describe commercial appli-
cations of digital signatures that are gaining market share today and
contrast them with the original consensus, and consider the implica-
Authentication, available at http://rechten.kub.n/simone/ds-fr.htm, which reaches similar
conclusions regarding market trends and legislation.
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tions of a major misperception of market trends for the future of elec-
tronic commerce legislation. A brief description of digital signatures
and public key infrastructure is included in the appendix to this arti-
cle.
II. THE ORIGINAL CONSENSUS: DIGITAL SIGNATURE AS
SIGNATURE
The first public key cryptographic system'8 was described in 1976
by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. 19 A short time later, Ronald
Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adelman developed another public key
system.20 The great advantage of a public key system is that it permits
individuals to use two different but related keys to maintain the con-
fidentiality of their communications. One key, the private key, is kept
secret by the owner, while the other key, the public key, can be widely
distributed. The two keys are mathematically related, but one of the
features of public key cryptography is that it is computationally infea-
sible to derive one key from knowledge of the other. A system within
which public keys are distributed is often referred to as a "public key
infrastructure"21 (PKI) and is designed to lower the costs associated
with distributing public keys while minimizing the risks of fraud and
error. The most widely known model of a PKI is based on the model of
a telephone directory.22 This model was first advanced by Diffie and
Hellman in a paper published in 1976,23 and expanded with the notion
18. See appendix for a discussion of the difference between conventional cryp-
tography, which depends on the use of two identical or "symmetric" keys, and public key,
or asymmetric key, cryptography, which depends on the use of two separate but related
keys.
19. SIMSON GARFINKEL, PGP: PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY 49 (1995).
20. Id.
21. In this article, the term "public key infrastructure" is used to mean any sys-
tem for regulating the distribution of public keys in a networked environment. The term
is often associated with specific designs for distributing public keys, such as the system
described in the ABA's Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 1. However, the idea of a
"web of trust" associated with the use of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) encryption program
might also be described as a "public key infrastructure" since PGP is based on asymmet-
ric cryptography. See GARFINKEL, supra note 19, at 213, for a description of PGP and the
web of trust.
22. Joan Feigenbaum, Towards an Infrastructure for Authorization, Position
Paper, 3rd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce (September 1998).
23. Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography,
IT-22 IEEE TRANSACTIONs ON INFORMATION THEORY 644 (1976), cited in Feigenbaum,
supra note 22.
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of "certificates" by a paper published in 1977 by Loren Kohnfelder,
then an undergraduate at MIT.
24
It has been widely assumed for a decade or more that digital sig-
natures used in combination with digital signature certificates dis-
tributed by trusted third parties within a public key infrastructure of
some description would revolutionize electronic contracting prac-
tices. 25 Digital signatures would provide a stable, reliable mechanism
for individuals to manifest their intent to be legally bound by the con-
tents of an electronic record and certificates would form a stable, reli-
able form of online identity card. Individuals would safeguard their
private keys, accessing them only under appropriate circumstances to
sign electronic records. Digital signature certificates issued and man-
aged by responsible parties would be included with electronic con-
tracting messages to provide counter parties with a quick, simple way
to confirm the real world identity of the author of the electronic com-
munication. The original consensus regarding the role of digital signa-
tures in electronic contracting assumed that there would be a migra-
tion away from older online authentication systems2 6 toward digital
signatures administered within a public key infrastructure. Within
that consensus there were vigorous debates about how the private key
required to create a digital signature should be kept secure and how
the public key infrastructure should be designed and administered. Of
course, there were also dissenters from the consensus who argued
that the gap between the state of the art of private key security and
public key infrastructure design on the one hand, and the needs of
transacting parties using the Internet or other networked communi-
cation systems today, were simply too great to be bridged in the fore-
seeable future.27
One major obstacle to wide scale deployment of digital signatures
in electronic contacting systems seems to be the complexity of the
business administration systems it purports to replace. In order to use
digital signatures as a functional analog of the messy patchwork of
systems now used to authenticate the identity and good faith of con-
tracting parties, the policies and hierarchies that make up a public
key infrastructure would have to be integrated with other elements of
business information systems that are necessary to permit contract
24. Loren M. Kohnfelder, Towards a Practical Public-Key Cryptosystem (1978)
(unpublished B.S. thesis), cited in Rohit Khare and Adam Rifkin, Weaving a Web of Trust,
v. 1.126 (Nov. 30, 1997), at http://www.cs.caltech.edu/-adam/ local/trust.html, n.37.
25. See supra Part I.
26. Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Inter-
net Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1177, 1184-1188 (1998).
27. See supra Part I.
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negotiations and contract formation to be automated. The policies and
hierarchies of individual organizations as well as those supporting the
public key infrastructure would have to be standardized for auto-
mated transaction processing to be possible among parties with no
prior business relationship. After nearly a decade of work in this area,
the problem seems no closer to resolution than it was five years ago.
There are several problems with the original consensus regard-
ing digital signatures in electronic commerce. One is whether the
metaphor "signature" is appropriate for what can be accomplished
with asymmetric cryptography and a public key infrastructure based
on certificates. A second is identifying the function a signature serves
in traditional contracting practices. A third set of problems are those
created by borrowing concepts that make sense in technological stan-
dards and trying to insert them into legal analyses in order to change
the law applicable to the technology, or borrowing legal concepts and
trying to insert them in technological standards in an attempt to ex-
pand the range of functions the technology can accommodate.
A. Does the Metaphor of "Signature" Make Sense for Asymmetric
Cryptography and Public Key Infrastructures?
The standard model of digital signatures and public key infra-
structure is based on the X.509 standard established by the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union ("ITU").2 s The X.500 standard was
developed to facilitate the use of telephone directories over a distrib-
uted telephone network such as might be found within a multina-
tional corporation. Different parts of the directory could be stored at
different locations on the network, such as the branch office where the
individuals whose telephone numbers were listed were employed. One
individual wishing to look up a listing for another individual would be
able to access the information without regard to where the listing was
actually maintained and stored.29
When the X.500 standard was being developed during the 1980s
by the ITU, the possible use of certificates issued to associate a real
world identity with a particular private key was one of the issues ad-
28. INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE, SECTION OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL SIGNATURE: LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC 18 (1996). The ITU X.500 series of
technical standards provides the basis for constructing a multipurpose distributed direc-
tory service by interconnecting computer systems belonging to service providers, govern-
ments, and private organizations, on a potentially global scale. WARICK FORD & MICHAEL
BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DIGITAL
SIGNATURES AND ENCRYPTION 213 (1997).
29. It is not clear that the X.509 standard works for telephone directories, but
that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
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dressed. 30 The X.509 standard sets forth a description of how a digital
signature certificate should be organized. By standardizing the con-
tent and presentation of the information contained in a certificate,
automated processing of certificates would be possible, as well as ex-
changes of certificates from different domains. Within a few years,
the original X.509 standard, which was designed with a distributed
telephone directory in mind, was deemed to be too limited in scope to
meet the needs of engineers designing network communication sys-
tems and was revised. The X.509 standard that is widely used in elec-
tronic commerce applications is version 3 ('X.509 v.3").3 1
The X.509 v.3 standard permits not just an identity to be speci-
fied in a certificate, but also policies that govern the certificate's use
to be specified. This extension of the X.509 standard to include more
than a simple real world identity to include policies that might de-
scribe the scope of authorized actions in the online environment was
thought to be key to extending the use of digital signature certificates
into electronic contracting. For example, an X.509 v.3 certificate
might limit its use to transactions below a specified dollar amount, or
within a specified geographical region, or to a specified product line. If
the electronic contracting systems of counterparties standardize their
policies regarding authority to form contracts, then a vendor's fulfill-
ment system could review the limitations in a digital signature certifi-
cate and without human intervention make a decision whether or not
to accept a purchase order submitted by a prospective purchaser.
Just because an X.509 v.3 certificate contains information about
the identity of an individual and may also contain information about
the authorized scope of the certificate's use or the authorized scope of
the individual's actions online, does not mean it is the analog of a sig-
nature. A signature is defined by the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts as "any symbol made or adopted with an intention, actual or
apparent, to authenticate the writing as that of the signer.'"
The commentary goes on to point out that a signature is not lim-
ited to a handwritten ink signature on paper, but may include a
thumbprint, impression of a rubber stamp, or arbitrary code.33 Under
appropriate circumstances, the act of afflxing a digital signature cer-
30. Carl Ellison, What do you need to know about the person with whom you are
doing business?, October 28, 1997, at http://world.std.com/-cme/html/congressl.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2001).
31. International Telecommunication Union ITU-T X.509 Recommendation
(06/97) Data Networks and Open System Communications Directory; Information Tech-
nology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON'TRACTS § 134 (1981).
33. Id. at cmt. 1.
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tificate to a message that has been signed by the private key associ-
ated with that certificate might actually constitute a signature, but
anyone making such a claim would have to be able to establish a con-
nection between the mental state of the individual to be bound and
the act of affixing the certificate and digital signature. The magnitude
and complexity of the network architecture and information system
security operating at each node on the network necessary to make
that connection in a reliable, routine manner is one of the major ob-
stacles now impeding the implementation of digital signature tech-
nologies.
There are several obvious problems raised by trying to tie an
identity described in a digital signature certificate with the intention
of the identified party to be bound to the contents of an electronic rec-
ord. These include whether the correct person has accessed the pri-
vate key associated with the digital signature being used; and if a
person other than the identified person has used the digital signature,
how that person was able to gain access without authorization and
who should bear responsibility for that unauthorized access. The
breach in security may occur at the level of the end user's failure to
take reasonable steps to safeguard access to a private key, or it may
occur because the software and hardware used to store the private
key have not been made reasonably secure. Before a digital signature
can be presumed to be an analog to a traditional manual signature,
the 'behavior, attitudes and sophistication of individuals using the
technology will have to be analyzed as well as the security character-
istics of the entire system within which an individual digital signa-
ture is used. At present, due in part to the lack of standardization
among implementations and depth of experience with actual use of
digital signature technologies as signatures, that information does not
yet exist. In addition, while it may be feasible at present to try to de-
velop and enforce such standards of behavior among participants in a
"closed" system in which members agree by contract or system rules
on the applicable standards, no one has yet found a feasible way to
standardize end user conduct in an "open" environment such as
Internet transactions between entities with no prior relationship.'
34. Documents such as certificate policies and certificate practice statements at-
tempt to spell out what behavior is expected of end users, and contracts or system rules
setting up closed systems create an obligation on the part of end users to conform their
behavior to those standards. E-mail from Rick Hornbeck to Jane K. Winn (Feb. 13, 2001)
(on file with author). For a discussion of the difficulties involved in drafting certificate
policies or certificate practice statements, see Jane K. Winn, The Hedgehog and the Fox:
Distinguishing Public and Private Sector Approaches to Managing Risk for Internet
Transactions, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 955 (1999).
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B. Why Do Signatures Matter in Traditional Contracting Practices?
When parties form agreements that they expect will be given le-
gal effect, a signature may or may not be part of the process of con-
tract formation. A signature is one type of evidence that is used to
show that one of the parties intended to enter into a legally binding
relationship, but it is not the only type. In some cases, a signature
may not even be a necessary piece of evidence. Just what kinds of evi-
dence of the intention of the parties to enter into a binding agreement
will be used in any specific transaction will vary according to the con-
text, including the subject matter for the particular transaction, the
communications media the parties are using, the course of dealings
between the parties, and the normal business practices in the market
or industry. In some situations, the law may require a party seeking
to enforce its rights to produce a writing signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought, but such requirements are scarcely uni-
versal. 5
However, once the metaphor of signature had seized the imagi-
nation of those looking for new commercial applications for digital
signature technology, the search for the "law of signatures" began. In
light of the characterization of asymmetric cryptography and a public
key infrastructure as a "signature," an obvious research problem was
to find the existing law of signatures to determine if it would validate
the use of this new technology. Such research efforts uncovered sur-
prisingly little "law of signatures" - some references in digests such as
AmJur and some discussion in negotiable instruments law treatises of
the proof of signatures on negotiable instruments, but no law review
articles at all prior to the 1990s.3 6
Finding a reason why "the dog didn't bark" is always a problem-
atic undertaking, but it is possible to conjecture why signatures were
largely a non-controversial subject in legal doctrine until very re-
cently. It is possible that the common law of contracts came to accept
a signature as part of the proof that should be offered of intent to be
bound so many centuries ago, and that the practice has continued for
so long with relatively little change, that the topic scarcely seemed
worthy of discussion. Under the medieval common law writ system,
signatures were irrelevant to the formation of binding obligations in
an era when few could read or write. Rather a covenant under seal
was the form of action that was used to enforce what in modern terms
35. JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF EEOMNIC COMMERCE §
5.03 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing Statute of Frauds issues).
36. See Winn, supra note 26, at 1216-1218 (summarizing the common law of
signatures).
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might be thought of as a contractual obligation. The pleading rules
for covenant under seal were highly formalistic: if a person's seal had
been used to authenticate a document, the only defense was to deny
the fact that it was the defendant's seal; mere unauthorized use of a
seal was not exculpatory. 8 Modern contract law grew out of the writ
of trespass, not covenant under seal, when the cause of action for
trespass on the case in assumpsit permitted enforcement of under-
takings that lacked the formality of covenant.39 The use of the writ of
trespass to give common law courts jurisdiction over undertakings
that lacked the formalism of covenants occurred in the 14th century.4"
By the 20th century, methods for proving informal agreements were
so well established and so uncontroversial that the topic seems not to
have merited sustained discussion outside of relatively limited con-
texts, such as the statute of frauds or evidence law.
When the technological baseline shifted from some form of
handwritten signature and some form of paper record to electronic
communications media, anyone trying to map the existing law of sig-
natures onto new commercial practices found no lengthy discussions
in general terms of the significance of signatures in contract law. The
definition of the issue took roughly the following form: (1) as a practi-
cal matter, digital signature technology can replace traditional man-
ual signatures in contract practice; (2) businesses will be discouraged
from adopting this new technology, however, if contracts formed with
digital signatures are not enforceable to the same extent as tradi-
tional paper contracts with manual signatures; (3) if a contract is
subject to a statute of frauds requirement of a signed writing, and
that requirement is interpreted to mean a manual signature on paper,
then that will limit the enforceability of contracts signed with digital
signatures; (4) so the significance of "signed writing" within the con-
37. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HIsTORY 360 (3rd ed.
1990).
38. FREDERICK G. KEMPIN, JR., HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW 215 (3rd ed. 1990). This formalism is similar to that of many "digital signature" stat-
utes which create a "presumption" that a signature is that of the owner of the private key
that created it. While a presumption is not the same as a liability rule, the lack of any re-
liable system for demonstrating who had access to a private cryptographic key at any par-
ticular time makes such a presumption tantamount to a liability rule. See Jane Winn &
Carl Ellison, U.S. Perspectives on Consumer Protection in the Global Economic Market-
place, comment P994312 to the Federal Trade Commission, (March 26, 1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/ comments/revwin-l.htm. For a UK perspective, see Nicholas
Bohm et al., Electronic Commerce: Who Carries the Risk of Fraud?, J. INFO. L. &
TECHNOLOGY (2000), available at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/00-3/bohm.html (reaching a
similar conclusion regarding contract terms used by UK banks in contracts with custom-
ers).
39. KEMPIN, supra note 38, at 374.
40. See BAKER supra note 37 at 375.
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text of the statute of frauds must be clarified. Over the last decade or
so, many attempts have been made to address this issue, although
most of the resulting accounts of the role of signatures in contract law
were not neutral, disinterested historical studies.41 Most of these very
recent accounts were colored by the conviction that digital signatures
were not only the logical and inevithble successor to manual signa-
tures on paper, but were also superior to traditional signatures for a
variety of reasons.
Studies of the role of signatures in contract law undertaken in
this context suffer from at least two distorting assumptions. The first
assumption is that the legal significance of signatures generally can
be understood by generalizing doctrines found within bodies of law
that make express reference to signatures, such as negotiable instru-
ments law or the statute of frauds. Second is the belief that current
contract practices lack the technological refinement and rigor that
will be possible when new, more powerful authentication technologies
are used. These distorting assumptions may result in seriously
flawed conclusions if the traditional methods of contract formation
never relied exclusively or even primarily on authentication of man-
ual signatures. For example, if the contracting parties were in a long-
term relational contract,42 authentication might rely primarily on oral
communications over the telephone, or by making reference to infor-
mation generated over a long-term course of dealing between the par-
ties.4 3 Even in contracts between strangers, there may be a lack of
formality that leads the parties to rely on information such as tele-
phone or face-to-face conversations, references from friends, adver-
tising and brand image, or even credit report data to ascertain reli-
ability of an expressed intention to form a binding contract. Obtaining
a valid signature is merely one element in a larger problem that the
contracting parties are trying to solve: the creation of an agreement
that is a 'legal, valid and binding obligation... [that] is enforceable..
in accordance with its terms. ' 4 The focus on the common law of sig-
41. Even a recent account that attempted neutrality on the question of techno-
logical successors to manual signatures on paper would nevertheless be biased by the
context of the discussion, namely, identifying what necessary functions manual signa-
tures served in contract practices that could now be served better by electronic equiva-
lents to manual signatures. See, e.g., Winn, supra note 26.
42. Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978).
43. For example, a bank customer service representative might ask a bank cus-
tomer to identify the last three deposits into an account before disclosing sensitive infor-
mation over the phone.
44. Special Comm. on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, N.Y. County
Lawyers' Ass'n, Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 BUS. LAW. 1891,
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
natures as the antecedent to digital signature laws is too narrow, and
overlooks the wide range of factors that might be taken into account
in assessing the likelihood that a contract formed by traditional
means will be enforceable.
C. What Does "Non-Repudiation" Mean?
A digital signature certificate includes information such as the
name of the person or entity to which the certificate was issued, and
information about policies governing the contexts in which the certifi-
cate may be used.45 One piece of information a digital signature cer-
tificate may include is whether the digital signature is "non-
repudiable." If the "non-repudiation" variable in the certificate has
been activated, then it should be harder for the person identified in
the certificate to deny that the electronic record has been "signed"
with his or her private signing key.
46
If a digital signature validated with reference to a certificate in
which the non-repudiation variable has been turned on cannot be de-
nied by the signer, then an electronic contract formed by affixing a
digital signature to an electronic record containing a statement of the
terms of the agreement should create an obligation that is 'legal,
valid and binding," and enforceable according to its terms. 7 But flip-
ping on a switch in a digital signature certificate is only one of the
many pieces of evidence a court would evaluate before coming to the
conclusion that an agreement is enforceable. 4 Notwithstanding this
1914 (1979). Paragraph 4 of the illustrative opinion letter states in full: "The Agreement
is a legal, valid and binding obligation of the Corporation and is enforceable against the
Corporation in accordance with the terms of-the Agreement, except as may be limited by
bankruptcy, insolvency, or other similar laws affecting the enforcement of creditors'
rights in general. The enforceability of the Corporation's obligations under the Agreement
is subject to general principles of equity (regardless of whether such enforceability is con-
sidered in a proceeding in equity or at law)." Id.
45. FORD & BAUM, supra note 28, at 227.
46. The X.509 v.3 standard paragraph 12.2.2.3 defines "key usage fields;" one of
which is a space for the "non-repudiation" bit. This bit can be used "[flor verifying digital
signatures used in providing a non-repudiation service which protects against the signing
entity falsely denying some action." ITU-T Recommendation X.509 12.2.2.3 (Aug. 1997);
Scott Renfro, Thoughts on Non-Repudiation, Feb. 23, 2001, available at http://www.ren
fro.org/scott/writing/non-repudiation-thoughts.txt.
47. Carl Ellison stated: 'The idea that digital signatures could enable electronic
commerce through what has come to be known as non-repudiation was first proposed by
Diffie and Hellman in their seminal paper, 'New Directions in Cryptography.' The idea
has since gained much popularity." Carl Ellison, SPKJ/SDSI Certificates, available at
http://world.std.coml-cme/html]/spki.html. Ellison defines "non-repudiation" as "the no-
tion that the keyholder is legally liable for any statement digitally signed by that key-
holder's signature key." Id.
48. In addition, "putting the bit in the certificate rather than in the signature it-
self is sure to complicate expectations. Without lots of education, most people would use
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non-congruence between the concept of an enforceable contract and
activating the non-repudiation bit in a digital signature certificate,
the concept of "non-repudiation" has been creeping into the discussion
of electronic contract formation. Muddying the distinction between a
legal conclusion and a technological function has contributed to the
persistence of the notion that digital signatures are the "next big
thing" in electronic contracting.
In principle, it is easy to understand what problems the non-
repudiation bit is designed to solve. For example, anyone would un-
derstand the difference in meaning between initialing a telephone
message taken for another person and signing a mortgage note; be-
tween waving a hand to catch the attention of a waiter and waving a
hand to make a bid at an auction house; or between shaking hands to
greet someone just introduced by a third party, or shaking hands to
indicate that a deal has been struck. In the online environment, com-
munications are stripped of many of the contextual clues that help the
parties to gauge each other's intentions. The non-repudiation bit could
provide an unmistakable signal of intent to form a binding agreement.
The problem with conflating the activation of the non-repudiation bit
with the formation of a binding contract generally is that it is possible
that the bit has been activated without the conscious participation of
the party who would be bound by it. If a connection cannot be estab-
lished between the activation of the non-repudiation bit and the in-
tent of a person capable of forming a contract, then the digital signa-
ture certificate is no more effective with the non-repudiation bit acti-
vated than with it turned off. Trying to insert the notion of "non-
repudiation" into the common law of contracts is at best redundant
and at worst misleading.
The term "non-repudiation" as it is used in the X.509 standard is
not a term that currently has any significance in contract law. The
term "non-repudiation" appears occasionally in other bodies of law,
but never with quite the same meaning ascribed to it in the X.509
standard. Even if the notion of "non-repudiation" makes sense in that
technical standard,49 there is no indication that it is a concept that
contract law needs to assimilate to retain its relevance in the 21st
century. The term has been used in the context of "non-repudiation" of
the same certs for both trivial and big-time-important transactions." E-mail from Neal
McBurnett to Jane K. Winn (Feb. 13, 2001) (on file with author).
49. It may not make sense even in the X.509 standard, however: 'The PKI
community has... repeatedly describe[d] non-repudiation as... 'a ... service ... [that]
protects against the signing entity falsely denying some action."' As anyone with children
knows, you cannot prevent someone from "falsely denying" an action. Renfro, supra note
46.
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collective bargaining agreements under the National Labor Relations
Act;50 "non-repudiation" of an earlier decision by the Atomic Energy
Commission; "'non-repudiation" of an ERISA plan; 2  "non-
repudiation" of a confession by a criminal;53 "non-repudiation" by a
trustee of a fiduciary duty to a beneficiary;4 and non-repudiation of
an agent's act by principal who accepts benefit.5 The first time the
term was used in the context of cryptographic functions, it appeared
in the recent Bernstein v. Department of State case. However, that
case dealt with the issue of whether cryptographic communications
were protected speech for First Amendment purposes, not contract
formation."
Electronic commerce law is not without any recognition of the
importance of clear attribution rules that facilitate enforcement of
agreements entered into in reliance on electronic authentication pro-
cedures. In UCC Article 4A, the use of a "commercially reasonable se-
curity procedure" makes it very difficult for the party from whose sys-
tem a payment order originated to repudiate an order sent over an
electronic funds transfer system, but the term "non-repudiation" is
not used in the statute.57 That legal result follows not simply from one
party having used a specific technology but from a prior agreement of
the parties to the transaction as well as the objective characteristics of
the technology in light of the context of the transaction.
Contract law does recognize the concept of "anticipatory repudia-
tion,' 6 which is a quite different concept than that evoked by the term
"non-repudiation." The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation applies to
situations where one party to a contract has indicated, by express
statement or by conduct, its intention not to perform its obligations
under the contract. The other party is permitted a range of options in
responding- it may wait to see if performance will ultimately be forth-
coming, it may resort to any remedy that would be available in the
event of a breach, or it may suspend its own performance. Repudia-
tion here refers to a manifestation of one party's intention not to per-
form under a contract, not a denial of the existence of the contract.
50. C.E.I. Industrial Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 921 F.2d 350 (1990).
51. S&E Contractors v. US, 406 U.S. 1, 62 (1972).
52. Lemanski v. Lenox Savings Bank, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6471 D. Mass.
1996).
53. U.S. ex rel. Johnson v. Lane, 639 F. Supp. 260 (N.D. Il1. 1986).
54. Norris v. Wirtz, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
55. Enos v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co, 57 N.W. 919 (S.D. 1894).
56. Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
57. U.C.C. §§ 4A-201 to 203.
58. U.C.C. § 2-610; JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-2 (5th ed. 2000).
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Notwithstanding the limited practical relevance of the non-
repudiation bit within a public key infrastructure, the concept of "non-
repudiation" as a new element of electronic contract law has taken on
a life of its own. Take, for example, this discussion of legislation that
grants special legal recognition to digital signatures. It conflates "non-
repudiation" as a function of technical processes with enforceability as
a function of legal processes:
Illinois... distinguishes between an electronic signature (and
says an electronic signature is just as good as the autograph)
and a digital signature. There are thus two levels of signa-
tures that are contemplated by the Illinois law: the difference
between them is that when you use a digital signature (the
encrypted kind), you get something called "non-repudiation."
In the context of an autograph, or in the context of an
electronic signature, the burden of proof is on the proponent of
the admission of the signature into evidence. The question in
court is whether the proponent can demonstrate that this is in
fact Neil Bardack's "signature" on the document, and that he
"authored" the e-mail. The new Illinois law says that if you
use a digital signature (the encrypted kind), you can shift the
burden of proof to the recipient of the message. With the shift
of the burden of proof it is the recipient's responsibility to
prove 'it wasn't me." This is one of the meanings of non-
repudiation. 59
This discussion seems to assume that, without regard to whether
the non-repudiation variable is activated, any digital signature vali-
dated with a certificate cannot be "falsely denied" by its putative
maker. It also seems to conflate the legal result that the putative
signer will not as a practical matter be able to challenge enforcement
of the digitally signed record, which is a result dictated by the statute
that grants special recognition to digital signatures, with the greater
certainty regarding who actually digitally signed the record and with
what intent, which is supposed to be a practical consequence of using
digital signature technology within a public key infrastructure. This
kind of confusion about the practical consequences of using digital
signature technology and the enforceability of electronic contracts is
all too common in discussions of digital signatures and their relevance
to contract law.
59. Richard Allan Horning, Legal Recognition of Digital Signatures: A Global
Status Report, 22 HASTINGS Comm. & ENT. L.J. 191, 197 (2000).
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Merely confirming that a digital signature can be validated with
reference to a certificate cannot take the place of designing a secure
system within which electronic agreements can be negotiated and
executed. Any form of computer security can be understood as a chain
that binds the participants in the information system. The security of
the system is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain.' The ac-
tivation of a non-repudiation bit communicates nothing if there is a
weak link in the security technology chain that purports to bind the
identify of a person to the contents of a digital signature certificate, or
the intent of the signer manifested by the act of signing to the concept
of non-repudiation. Such a weak link might arise as a result of a con-
fusing interface design which leads individuals to activate the non-
repudiation bit without knowing what significance others assign to it;
a software application that activates the non-repudiation bit without
seeking any confirmation from the person whose intention it purports
to express that it should be activated; or a flaw in the design of a se-
curity system which permits one person to activate the non-
repudiation bit in the digital signature certificate of another person
without authorization."'
If there is a design flaw somewhere in the public key infrastruc-
ture, within which digital signature certificates are distributed and
used, then the connection between a person's manifestation of intent
to be legally bound by digitally signing a record and the relying
party's ability to validate a digital signature with a certificate will be
broken and the apparent force of contracts formed within the public
key infrastructure will be illusory. The strength of security functions
elsewhere in the system may be simply irrelevant in trying to deter-
mine the reliability of the system overall. This is why any discussion
of how many years it would take to break the security of a crypto-
graphic system by using a brute force attack to guess the value of the
key used,62 is usually a red herring that simply distracts attention
from more important issues.
60. Ellison and Schneier, supra note 2.
61. E-mail from Ben Laurie to Jane K. Winn (Feb. 13, 2001) (on file with
author).
62. E.g., "Refined Standards, New Concepts Taking Shape," EWEEK, Dec. 4,
2000 at 103, awailable at Lexis News ("A code-breaking scheme that takes only 1 second
to defeat today's DES [Digital Encryption Standard] would need 149 trillion years to
crack a 128-bit implementation of the forthcoming AES [Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard."); cf , Bruce Schneier, Security Pitfalls in Cryptography, at http://www.counterpane.
com/pitfalls.html ("Magazine articles like to describe cryptography products in terms of
algorithms and key length. Algorithms make good sound bites: they can be explained in a
few words and they're easy to compare with one another: '128-bit keys mean good secu-
rity,' Triple-DES means good security,' '40-bit keys mean weak security,' or '2048-bit RSA
is better than 1024-bit RSA' But reality isn't that simple. Longer keys don't always mean
more security.").
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There are not yet any clear standards regarding what steps users
can reasonably be expected to take to keep private keys secure, or how
users should be alerted to different possible meanings that may be as-
signed to the use of a digital signature certificate. If a private key
used to make a digital signature is stored on the hard drive of a per-
sonal computer and can be accessed by typing in a user ID and pass-
word, then the private key is no more secure than the user ID and
password. If the user tapes his or her user ID and password to the
monitor of the personal computer, it would not be possible to say who
had accessed the digital signature. In the absence of well established
standards to evaluate the reasonableness of user behavior and hu-
man-computer interface designs, the connection between the inten-
tion of an individual to be bound by an act executed by computer and'
the evidence that the act was executed will remain difficult to estab-
lish. The fact that a non-repudiation bit was activated in a digital sig-
nature certificate will be one piece of information relevant to a deter-
mination that an online contract was formed. However, it is only one
of many, and hardly sufficient in and of itself to establish that a legal,
valid and binding obligation was formed.
III. COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE
TECHNOLOGY
The volume of transactions being conducted over the Internet
continues to grow rapidly notwithstanding the lack of acceptance of
digital signature technology to create the equivalent of a traditional
signature. In the context of business-to-consumer transactions, busi-
nesses are relying on the infrastructure that was developed to support
mail/telephone order transactions using credit cards.6 This infra-
structure includes verifying certain information such as the billing
address before seeing the authorization from the credit card issuer,
and running fraud detection software to identify transactions with a
higher than acceptable likelihood of being fraudulent. In business-to-
business transactions, businesses are relying on a modified version of
the old EDI trading partner agreement to enroll parties in a closed
system." The trading partner agreement will specify what technology
the parties have chosen to identify themselves online and assign re-
sponsibility for fraud or error losses that may occur due to a failure in
that technology or the failure of one party to implement it correctly.
63. Jane Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition between Estab-
lished and Emerging Electronic Payment Systems, 14 BERK. TECH. L. J. 675 (1999).
64. See generally, ABA Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, supra note 6.
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Just because asymmetric cryptography used in a public key in-
frastructure is not a viable substitute for a traditional signature does
not mean that it is not a powerful and important security technology
in wide use today. One of the great commercial successes of digital
signatures today is the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) communication
security.5 Part of the key to the success of SSL in the marketplace
seems to be that it does not perform any functions analogous to a
"signature." It merely permits communications between a browser
running on a personal computer and a server to be encrypted in tran-
sit, guaranteeing the confidentiality of the communications between
the personal computer and the server."
SSL provides some assurance to individuals visiting web sites on
the Internet that the sites are genuine merchant sites, and are not
operated by a mere hacker masquerading as a legitimate business.
The SSL service also provides assurance that transfers of information
between the local computer (or "client') and the server are confiden-
tial and are received intact. Web server applications that support elec-
tronic commerce come with software that manages the keys and the
encryption processes in a way that is "transparent" to the visitor to
the web site. In Netscape Navigator or Microsoft Explorer, for exam-
ple, the local user is only alerted to the fact that communications be-
tween the client and the server are encrypted when an icon such as a
key or a padlock changes, or a dialog box pops up to inform the user
that a secure session will be initiated. When an electronic commerce
site is set up on the server, public and private keys are generated by a
security program, and the public key is used to obtain a certificate
from a certificate authority.67 SSL server certificates are transferred
to the client computer for use in the user's browser, either when the
browser is first installed on the local client, or in a communication
with the server." When a user accesses a Web site that is SSL-
enabled, the server first sends a signed copy of the server's digital
signature certificate, which the local client verifies. The local client
65. There is an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard called Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) that is based on SSL. TLS Protocol Version 1.0 is available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt?number=2246.
66. Even that guarantee is not absolute, however. "Handoffs can take place that
mean that the certificate validates a different site than what appears in the 'Location:'
box in the browser." E-mail from Neal McBurnett to Jane K Winn (Feb. 13, 2001) (on file
with author).
67. For a more detailed explanation of this process, see SIMSON GARFINKEL,
WEB SECURITY AND JUSTICE (1997). The role played by certificate authorities in public key
infrastructures is discussed in the Appendix.
68. In fact, several public key certificates are included in the initial installation
of recent releases of Netscape's browser. These certificates can be viewed by choosing Se-
curity Preferences from the Options pull-down menu in any recent release of Netscape
Navigator.
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next generates a session key"e that it encrypts with the server's public
key and sends back to the server. All subsequent messages sent be-
tween the local user and the server will be encrypted with the session
key, so credit card information or other sensitive information cannot
be misappropriated even in the unlikely event it is intercepted.
If the metaphor of signature were imposed on the function of
SSL, the best that could be said is that the server has a digital signa-
ture certificate, but the public key contained in the certificate is used
to encrypt something, not to sign something. Even if it was used to
sign something, the signature would be of the server, not of the corpo-
ration or individual that owned the server. It is hard to imagine under
what circumstances a piece of machinery such as a server could be
deemed to be party to a contract. Furthermore, there would be no way
to show that the user operating the browser software on the personal
computer had made a conscious decision to accept something signed
by the server, since the authentication of the server's digital signature
certificate is made possible through the use of certificate authority
certificates that come "pre-installed" in the user's browser software.
Given that the user made no decision to trust the certificates pre-
installed in the browser software, any act taken following authentica-
tion of a digital signature certificate using those pre-installed certifi-
cates cannot be said to be taken in reliance on the authentication pro-
cess performed by the browser software. So if the SSL application cre-
ates anything like a "signature," it would be the signature of a piece of
machinery reviewed and accepted by a piece of software under condi-
tions that do not permit either the machine or the software to be
treated as the electronic agent of either machine owner or the soft-
ware owner.
Just because asymmetric cryptography has not yet successfully
been used in a "signature" application in electronic commerce in the
United States does not mean it never will be, however. It is possible
that standards for the implementation of digital signatures within a
public key infrastructure are now being developed and tested, and
will be deployed successfully in the next generation of electronic
commerce technologies. There are at least two possible strategies that
might make it possible for digital signatures to gain widespread ac-
ceptance: the issuance of digital signature certificates by trusted third
parties who are prepared to guarantee the accuracy of the contents of
digital signature certificates, and a workable system of cross-
certification that would permit certificates issued within different
69. The symmetric key might be based on the Data Encryption Standard (DES)
or other recognized standard.
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"closed" systems to be accepted by individuals or organizations outside
the issuing system. If a trusted third party were willing in effect to
guarantee the enforceability of transactions executed in reliance on
the certificates, then digital signature certificates would have an obvi-
ous value to prospective online trading partners that have no prior
relationship with each other. At present, no one has yet found a viable
business model for issuing certificates and guaranteeing the contents
of those certificates, but this problem may be solved at some point.
Cross-certification might be based on a closed system such as a corpo-
ration that issues identity certificates to its employees and permits
employees to gain access to resources or perform actions within the
system based on the information contained within the certificate. In
order for the second corporation to accept the first corporation's cer-
tificates in making decisions whether to grant access to its own re-
sources or permit actions to be taken by employees of the first corpo-
ration, the two corporations will have to standardize many internal
policies and procedures. At present, that degree of standardization of
corporate policies and procedures has not yet been achieved, but it
remains possible that it will be at some point in the future.
One example of a more complex business model for harmonizing
corporate policies and digital signature technology sufficiently to
permit digital signatures to become an essential element in electronic
contract formation is Identrus10 Identrus is a joint venture of major
banks that are trying to harmonize the traditional risk management
functions performed by banks in connection with extending credit to
their customers with the demands of Internet commerce for a more
powerful system of online identities. The Identrus organization will
provide the root certificate authority service for its member banks,
which in turn will certify the online identities of bank customers. This
service is highly reminiscent of more traditional bank services, such
as letter of credit, in which two parties with no prior relationship or
other basis for trust ask bank intermediaries to guarantee essential
elements of each party's performance under the contract. With the
reputation and credit of the intermediary banks to support the repu-
tation and credit of the bank customer's transactions, that would oth-
erwise be declined as too risky, these transactions can now go for-
ward. Individual banks participating in the Identrus system would
leverage their existing knowledge of their clients' identity and credit-
worthiness to guarantee elements of their clients' performance of on-
line contracts.
70. Information about Identrus is available from the Identrus Web site at
www.identrus.com.
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While the business model Identrus is based upon is very plausi-
ble, it will be sometime before it is clear whether this model is in fact
viable in the marketplace. Banks are uniquely positioned to guaran-
tee online identities and creditworthiness because banks have inter-
nal expertise in network security associated with electronic funds
transfer transactions, and they have access to internally generated in-
formation about their customers' business operations. Nevertheless
Identrus may still fail to achieve widespread acceptance in the mar-
ketplace if it proves more difficult than expected to persuade banks to
add online authentication services to the packages of services banks
already offer their customers, or if bank customers are not interested
in subscribing to such a service at a price that covers the bank's cost
of providing such a service.
IV. LAW REFORM AND AUTHENTICATION IN ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE
Never try to teach a pig to sing. It wastes your time and it an-
noys the pig.7
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act sensibly refrained from
trying to teach any pigs to sing when it adopted a 'technology neutral"
perspective to the formation of electronic contracts. Laws such.as the
Utah Digital Signature Act, which describe a specific implementation
of asymmetric cryptography within a public key infrastructure, have
been consigned to the margins of electronic commerce when the mar-
ketplace failed to embrace their vision of digital signatures. Merely
because a statute does not refer to a particular computer security
technology does not mean that the security technology is not vitally
important to electronic commerce. Silence within a statute with re-
gard to technological specifics may rather indicate a decision to leave
decisions about the network architecture of electronic commerce to
private agreements among the parties and technological standard de-
veloping organizations. Furthermore, silence within a statute with re-
gard to technological specifics does not imply that the statute does not
allocate responsibility among the participants to an electronic trans-
action for the adequacy of the security systems they adopt.
The two most important provisions in the UETA that have the ef-
fect of allocating responsibility among participants to an electronic
71. American proverb, cited in Alice M. Batchelder, Judges on Judging: Some
Brief Reflections of a Circuit Judge, 54 OHio ST. L.J. 1453, 1460 (1993). This saying may
have originated with Robert A. Heinlein, Time Enough for Love (1974). E-mail from Greg
Rose to Jane K. Winn (Feb. 17, 2001) (on file with author).
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transaction for the adequacy of the security systems they adopt are
section 5(b) which provides that the UETA applies only to transac-
tions in which the parties have each agreed to the use of electronic
media;" and section 9(a) which provides that an electronic record or
signature is attributable to a person only if it is in fact produced by an
act of that person. Because the UETA does not contain any presump-
tions that shift the burden of proof, a person seeking enforcement of
rights under a contract executed with electronic media, with the in-
tent to rely on the general validation of such transactions provided by
the UETA, will have to prove the other party's consent to the use of
electronic media and the other party's actual use of the electronic me-
dia in forming the contract. Because there is not yet in wide use a sys-
tem that reliably binds a person with online actions, including mani-
festing assent to the use of electronic media or execution of an elec-
tronic signature or writing, the party seeking enforcement will lhave a
very considerable burden of proof to meet as a practical matter. The
risk that an agreement will not be enforceable, because the party
seeking enforcement could not meet its burden of proof, creates eco-
nomic incentives for parties that wish to enter into electronic agree-
ments on a regular basis to participate in standard setting efforts,
such as the development of a system of rules along the lines of the
Visa and MasterCard system rules, or the development of clearing
house-type agreements that govern the rights and obligations of par-
ties wishing to enter into electronic contracts.
The UETA approach to dealing with the fact that today there is
no widely accepted, strong electronic authentication system in place
that can be used in Internet commerce creates a rational risk alloca-
tion both for the present and for the future. At present, there is a be-
wildering array of pilot projects and press releases touting solutions
to the problem on strong authentication for electronic contracts, but
no clear indication of which way the market will move when eventu-
ally some more advanced form of authentication technology becomes
the new market standard. In a world of many choices but few widely
accepted standards, the issue arises which party should bear the risk
that a new method of contracting is more risky than one of the meth-
ods of contracts in widespread use today - face-to-face agreement; ex-
change of faxes; telephone or mail order. The UETA puts the in-
creased risk associated with the new method on whichever party ends
up seeking enforcement of the contract. That party will have to absorb
the costs of researching alternatives and implementing new technolo-
72. For a criticism of the notion that the use of electronic media in a transaction
should justify separate treatment in commercial law, see Joseph Sommer, Against Cyber-
law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1170-1171 (2000).
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gies until more secure alternatives to today's Internet communica-
tions become available. As a practical matter, that party is more likely
to be a business than a consumer, because as repeat players, busi-
nesses stand to reap considerable savings by switching from commu-
nications media in use today to more sophisticated alternatives.
While it is not possible to predict the future legal framework of
online contract formation with any certainty, the automated teller
networks in wide use today in the United States and around the world
offer an interesting vision of what the future may hold. ATM net-
works are secured using various security technologies, many of which
rely on advanced cryptographic processes that resemble digital signa-
tures created with asymmetric cryptography and administered within
a public key infrastructure. Many of the technological standards that
govern those technologies and assure uniformity and interoperability
are the product of the American National Standards Institute X.9 Ac-
credited Standards Committee for financial services security stan-
dards.73 Among the parties free to set their rights and obligations by
private agreement, such as depository institutions and merchants,
those agreements may require participants in the system to conform
to those standards. Bank supervisory agencies oversee the participa-
tion by regulated financial intermediaries in ATM networks to insure
that their risk exposure is kept to acceptable levels within the scope of
their respective legislative mandates. Consumer liability for using the
ATM network, by contrast, is limited by statutory mandates that force
the business parties developing, maintaining and using the network
to accept responsibility for the security and reliability of the network.
ATM networks have expanded their reach outside the borders of the
United States through private agreements with foreign banks, mer-
chants and networks. There is no analog in the law of consumer elec-
tronic funds transfers to the kind of technology-specific legislation
that has been used to promote the adoption of digital signatures.
PKI systems are under development today that may one day
bring a level of security to Internet contracting that resembles the se-
curity in use today in the ATM networks. The business need for
workable, secure contracting systems is tremendous, and huge in-
vestments are being made to try to bring products to market that will
meet that need. It is possible that interest in PKI systems will in-
crease if businesses experience losses as a result of difficulties in en-
73. The work of the ANSI X.9 committee is available from its web site at
http://www.x9.org/. The ANSI Web store includes a list of standards used in financial
services industry, including many based on encryption technologies. See http://webstore
.ansi.org/ansidocstore/dept.asp?dept-id=80.
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forcing electronic contracts formed using less secure technologies. For
example, a business that relies on proving that someone clicked
through a particular graphical user interface in order to form the con-
tract may find that it is difficult to meet its burden of proof if the con-
tract in question has a high dollar value and the other party vigor-
ously contests the evidence. 74 In addition, market acceptance of PKI
technologies would increase if digital signature technologies are of-
fered to businesses in a form that is nearly as transparent to the con-
tracting parties and as reliable as is the security on the ATM net-
works, or embedded within sophisticated risk management applica-
tions that address not just the problem of authentication of counter-
parties to transactions, but other traditional risks such as credit risks
or risk of being drawn into litigation in a remote or hostile forum.
V. CONCLUSION
The other day upon the stair, I met a man who wasn't there.
He wasn't there again today - oh, how I wish he'd go away.
74. In litigation involving click-through contracts to date, there is no indication
the party seeking enforcement has been held to a particularly high standard. An argu-
ment that click-through interfaces are unlikely to meet the needs of businesses wishing to
form contracts online was made in a posting to the ABA Information Security Committee
listserv by Hoyt L. Kesterson II, on February 22, 2001:
(P]oint and click could be acceptable but that if there was a challenge, then
one might be forced to explain that the transactions written on the log were
processed during an authenticated session and that even though the log rec-
ords contained messages that could have been generated by anyone, a review
of all the code involved would prove that the messages could have only been
written by the user who was authenticated by his password. And while, yes, it
is true that someone could have modified the logs after the fact, there are
procedures in place that blocks outsiders from accomplishing such tasks, and
although people in the company could have modified the logs, this company
doesn't do that sort of thing. I suggest that it should be easier to demonstrate
that a digitally signed message held in the log was in all probability origi-
nated by the user. And while it is true that the code in a pc could be buggered
in such a way that it did not reflect the originator's intent to sign, it is proba-
bly easier to subvert a point-and-click system. Even if one argues that the
possibility of problems in the pc are the same for both point-and-click and
digital signature, at least in the digital signature system one can focus on the
pc - not on the whole distributed system and network. So while point and
click might be acceptable for low risk transactions such as buying a book at
amazon.com, it may not be adequate for higher risk applications one must
also consider those areas where a persistent record of a signature is required.
I have a hard time believing that one could easily prove that a 5 year old
point-and-click commitment was done properly.
Id.
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Ogden Nash
The problem of online authentication is proving more difficult to
solve than Internet commerce pioneers anticipated a decade ago. The
push toward greater integration of enterprise applications and more
robust open network contracting systems is making the problems of
designing and implementing strong online authentication technology
ever more complex. As a result, notwithstanding the vast sums of
money that have been poured into developing and marketing prom-
ising potential solutions, the problem today seems nearly as intracta-
ble as it was several years ago.
Over the next five or ten years, huge additional quantities of re-
sources will be poured into finding solutions to the problem of secure
online authentication. It is very possible that a standard for secure
online authentication will be developed that meets the diverse objec-
tives of transacting parties and that can be incorporated into the next
generation of electronic commerce technologies. As a result, it is pos-
sible that such a standard might become widely adopted and form
part of a new platform for electronic contracting technologies that in-
corporate the Internet as a communications medium.
With so much present uncertainty regarding what standards will
ultimately be developed to meet the needs of contracting parties, and
which among those standards will achieve widespread market accep-
tance, it seems clear that electronic commerce legislation should not
try to promote the use of a particular technology. The early digital
signature statutes did not merely promote a specific technology, they
also promoted a specific standard for the use of that technology. Many
years and untold millions of dollars later, no major market partici-
pants have been able to promote widespread use of that technology
based on that standard. Legislators around the world seem unaware
of the difference between the projections of future utilization by inter-
ested parties and actual use of a technology. Years of experimentation
has revealed that digital signatures are poorly suited for use as a sub-
stitute for manual signatures. The effort to make a digital signature
work like a manual signature has resulted in the widespread misper-
ception of the role of signatures in the formation of binding electronic
contracts. This confusion over appropriate uses of this technology and
its contribution to contract formation has in turn led to the introduc-
tion of extraneous and unhelpful concepts into the discussion of elec-
tronic contract formation, such as "non-repudiation," which only serve
to obscure further the terms of the discussion.
The UETA is a notable exception to that trend. It incorporates
simple, rational risk allocation rules that can accommodate both the
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lack of a widely accepted standard today for strong authentication
and the possible future development of such standards through the
work of technical standard developing organization and private
agreements and system rules. While legislation is poorly suited to ei-
ther describing specific applications for electronic commerce technolo-
gies or promoting market adoption of specific technologies, it is well
suited to providing rational incentives to the parties capable of shap-
ing the architecture of electronic commerce in the future.
VI. APPENDIX: ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY, DIGITAL
SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE7 5
Cryptographic security techniques permit information to be
shared between two remote parties by minimizing the risk that the in-
formation will be intercepted by unfriendly parties or surreptitiously
modified in transit. The communicating parties first establish a "ci-
pher" that is used to transform a text into a secure form. The original
text is called the "plaintext;" the text after cryptography has been ap-
plied is known as the "ciphertext."
The process of converting plaintext to ciphertext is a function of
the encryption algorithm. In modern cryptography, encryption algo-
rithms are complex mathematical functions incorporated into soft-
ware that combine the plaintext with a "key" to produce the cipher-
text. The key is a long, seemingly random number, the size of which is
measured in bits.16 The unique value of the key causes the encryption
algorithm to produce a unique ciphertext; if the plaintext is modified
in any respect, the ciphertext will vary. The better able a cryptosys-
tem is to resist attacks, the more secure it is thought to be. Keys in
commercial encryption software use 40-bit, 48-bit, 56-bit, 64-bit, and
128-bit keys; the more bits, the stronger the encryption."
75. The following discussion is based on JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT,
THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 1.04. (4th ed. 2001).
76. The basic unit of information in programming is a bit, or binary digit. Be-
cause computer circuits recognize two levels in electronic current, these two levels of cur-
rent form the basic binary on/off or 0/1 switches used to communicate data in a digital
format. A bit is one unit of information. A byte comprises eight bits. Volumes of digital
data are measured in bytes, as in kilobytes (KB), which consist of 1024 bytes, or mega-
bytes (MB), which consist of 1,048,576 bytes.
77. Responding to a $1,000 challenge from RSA Data Security, a 23-year-old
U.C. Berkeley graduate, Ian Goldberg, broke a 40-bit key-the most secure data encryp-
tion the US government allows for export--in 31/ hours. There are a trillion possible
combinations for a 40-bit key. Goldberg broke it by linking 250 workstations and pro-
gramming them to run all possible combinations at a rate of 100 billion per hour. Sharon
Machlis, RSA Stunt Shows Up Encryption Weakness, COMPUTER WORLD, February 3,
1997. In June 1997, responding to a $10,000 challenge from RSA Data Security, a loosely
organized group of 14,000 volunteers managed to break a 56-bit key after five months of
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In conventional or symmetric cryptography, the same key is used
to encrypt and decrypt the message.
Asymmetric cryptography uses two different but mathematically
related keys. One key is the "public key," which can be distributed
widely without regard to confidentiality; the other is the "private key,"
which must be kept confidential and carefully secured. The public key
may be used to encrypt information that may only be decrypted by the
private key; the private key may be used to encrypt information that
may only be decrypted by the public key. Because the private key
cannot be extrapolated from the public key, the public key may be
widely distributed without risk to the secrecy of the private key. En-
cryption with a public key might be useful in sending a message to the
holder of the related private key because such a message can only be
decrypted and read by the person in possession of the private key. En-
cryption with a private key may be useful in sending a message from
the holder of the private key because anyone who uses the public key
to decrypt the message is reassured that it was sent by no one other
than the holder of the related private key.
One problem with public key cryptography is that it may be more
computationally intensive than some forms of conventional (symmet-
ric key) cryptography, making it impractical to use public key cryp-
tography to encrypt large files. This drawback of public key cryptog-
raphy can be solved in several ways, including the use of message di-
gests to ensure the integrity (but not the confidentiality) of the
transmitted file, and the use of conventional cryptographic session
keys to encrypt the file in combination with public key cryptography
to transmit the session key securely. Message digests, or hash func-
tions, help solve the practical problems associated with encrypting en-
tire messages. A message digest produced using a "one-way hash
function" is a unique mathematical digest of an entire data file. Iden-
tical texts run through the hash function will produce the same di-
gest, but even the smallest change in the text will produce a different
digest, alerting the recipient to the fact that the integrity of the mes-
sage has been compromised. If a guarantee of message integrity
work. The group distributed code-breaking software over the Internet and used idle com-
puters around the world to perform the calculations, with the key being found after trying
about a quarter of the 72 quadrillion possibilities. Lynda Radosevich, Hackers Prove
56-bit DES Is Not Enough, INFOWORLD, June 30, 1997, at 77. RSA Data Security used the
fact that the 40-bit and 56-bit keys could be broken in its efforts to block legislation intro-
duced in Congress to require regulation of encryption using 56-bit or stronger keys, and
to encourage the Commerce Department to relax export restrictions on stronger forms of
encryption.
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rather than confidentiality of the message text is all that is required,
a message digest can be an effective solution to the security problem.
It is also possible to combine symmetric key cryptography and
asymmetric key cryptography to improve communication security
while minimizing the demands made on computing resources. In or-
der for this application to be executed, the sender must already be in
possession of the recipient's public key, and the recipient must al-
ready be in possession of the sender's public key. The secure e-mail
application of the sender of the message generates a "session key" or
symmetric key for only one use, usually using a well-accepted form of
conventional cryptography such as DES or the International Data En-
cryption Algorithm (IDEA). The e-mail application then encrypts the
contents of the message with the session key before encrypting the
session key with the recipient's public key and sending both the en-
crypted message and the encrypted session key. The recipient uses
her private key to decrypt the session key and then uses the session
key to decrypt the message.
A digital signature consists of using a private key to encrypt a
message digest and then affixing the resulting record to the message
itself. In this sense, a digital signature is part of a message that indi-
cates the source of the message and signifies that the message has not
been altered in transit. In order for a digital signature to function as
the equivalent of a traditional manual signature, there must be a reli-
able, secure system that permits only the authorized signer to access
the private key and affix the digital signature to a message. As with
the secure e-mail application, the sender and the recipient must have
exchanged public keys prior to sending the digitally signed message.
For a digital signature to be affixed to a message, first the signer runs
the message through the hash function to produce the message digest.
The message digest is then encrypted with the signer's private key,
and the result is the digital signature which is affixed to the message.
Although the text of the message is not confidential, it is now accom-
panied by a digital signature unique to the message that can be veri-
fied only with the use of the signer's public key.
The verification process takes place when the recipient of the
message uses the same hash function as the sender to produce a di-
gest of the message independently. The recipient then takes the pub-
lic key of the sender and decrypts the message digest from the sender.
If the two match, the digital signature has been verified. If a digital
signature is removed from the message it was intended to authenti-
cate and attached to a different message, or the original message is
modified in any way, then the verification will fail.
The reliability of any cryptographic system depends in large part
on the reliability of the system for distributing keys. Symmetric key
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distribution systems are difficult and expensive to manage. For ex-
ample, a simple, secure system for distributing symmetric keys is to
require a face-to-face meeting between the individuals who will use a
key to communicate in the future. Reliable key distribution systems
for groups with many members in different geographical locations
may require travel by couriers or the use of other cumbersome or ex-
pensive secure communication systems.
Key distribution problems in asymmetric key cryptography sys-
tems may be less difficult to solve than key distribution problems in
symmetric key distribution systems because a public key can be
widely distributed without fear of compromising the security of the
private key. In a symmetric key system, by contrast, the single key
must be kept private by both parties and never be distributed widely;
if that key ever falls into the hands of an unintended recipient, the
parties should stop using it and replace it with a new key. Key man-
agement remains an issue with public key cryptography, however, be-
cause once the private key has been created and the related public
key distributed, the owner of the private key is at risk if the security
of the private key is compromised, because an attacker could then im-
personate the true owner of the key.
After keys have been distributed, their use must be managed.
Private keys must be kept secure and under the exclusive control of
the person or object associated with the key and users must be noti-
fied whenever the security of a private key is compromised so that the
corresponding public key is no longer used. Systems developed to
manage keys are referred to as public key infrastructures (PKIs).
There are many different approaches to designing a PKIs. Systems
that facilitate the verification of digital signatures between strangers
over the Internet are usually referred to as "open PKI" solutions. Sys-
tems that rely on binding, in advance, all the relevant parties to a
digitally signed transaction with a system of contract that spells out
the legal consequences of using public key cryptography or that im-
plement a PKI in a bound community with a defined group of mem-
bers are usually referred to as "closed PK" solutions.
One solution to the key distribution problem that may lower the
costs of maintaining the public key infrastructure is to find a trusted
third party to be responsible for binding an individual with a public
key.78 One type of trusted third party is a certification authority (CA).
78. Other solutions include the "web of trust" used in the Pretty Good Privacy
system (PGP) of digital signatures. Individuals indicate their trust in the public keys of
other individuals by "certifying" them with their own digital signatures; the PGP program
reviews the digital signatures that certify the validity of a new public key to determine if
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The CA reviews some evidence that a particular individual is appro-
priately using a digital signature, and then issues a "certificate" con-
taining a copy of the public key of the individual signed by the CA.
The individual seeking certification is known as a "subscriber." Any-
one who wishes to verify the digital signature of that individual may
use the public key of the individual in the certificate. A person who
uses the certificate to verify the digital signature is known as the "re-
lying party." A CA establishes policies that govern the circumstances
under which it issues certificates; these policies are then published in
a "certification practice statement" disclosing those policies to any po-
tential subscribers or relying parties.
In order for a certificate issued by a particular CA to be accept-
able to a prospective relying party, the CA must establish its trust-
worthiness in some way. That trustworthiness may depend on its
reputation in traditional business transactions, or the CA may in turn
be a subscriber of a higher CA, and use the certificate of the higher
CA to reassure subscribers and relying parties that it is not a bogus
CA. The CA at the pinnacle of the CA hierarchy is known as a "root"
CA in such a system; a government might provide root CA services to
reduce the possibility of rogue CAs.79
Another fundamental key management issue to be resolved is
how the revocation or termination of keys should be handled once
they have been widely distributed. A key owner may wish to revoke a
public key if the security of the private key has been compromised, or
may have a policy of retiring keys after a certain period of time has
passed to reduce the probability of the key being broken in an attack.
In addition, the CA may wish to cancel a certificate if it becomes
aware of improprieties in its issuance or at the request of the sub-
scriber. A relying party should investigate the current status of a cer-
tificate before relying on it to learn if it is still effective. A CA might
provide an authorization service like that provided by credit card
companies, in which a potential relying party contacts the CA before
relying, to learn if the certificate is still outstanding and has not been
revoked for any reason. However, if the CA's practice statement limits
its review to the time of issuance, then there is no ongoing monitoring
by the CA of the subscriber's status. The CA may maintain a "certifi-
cation revocation list" where notices by subscribers are posted as soon
as received, and that any prospective relying party should check be-
fore verifying a digital signature.
it has been signed by someone the recipient trusts. See SIMSON GARFINKEL, supra note
19, at 235.
79. See Winn and Wright, supra note 35, § 5.07 (describing recent e-commerce
legislation including CAs); see also, Baker & McKenzie Web site, Electronic and Digital
Signature Resources, at http://www.bmck.con/ecomme rce/topic-esignatures.htm.
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